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In Understanding the United Kingdom, Richard Rose wrote that only a too-clever-by-half theorist ‘would create a state with two separate legal systems (one Scots and the other for England, Wales and more or less for Northern Ireland), have two different state churches, or govern one its parts by ‘temporary’ direct rule’ (Northern Ireland). This diversity was consistent with the maintenance of the Union, he thought, ‘as long as all partners continue to accept the authority of the Crown in Parliament’ (1982: 62). Rose spoke also of the ‘asymmetry’ of these ‘multiform institutions’ and also of England’s rather anomalous place within it. Asymmetry itself is clearly not new in British constitutionalism nor is it the recent enormity that some have claimed (see Keating 1998). Rose’s point was to indicate the distinctive success of the United Kingdom in sustaining political cohesion despite these differences and asymmetry and this is what Rose called the ‘steady state’ Union. 25 years later and after the establishment of devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland one can detect an inversion of Rose’s argument. Douglas Hurd, for example, thought that the United Kingdom had become a ‘system of amazing untidiness - a Kingdom of four parts, of three secretaries of state, each with different powers, of two assemblies and one Parliament, each different in composition and powers from the others’ (cited in Bogdanor 2007). The implication of Hurd’s remarks was that these particular arrangements are less likely to work efficiently or positively and that the system is no longer so robust. That is the new uncertain context in which discussion of Britishness now takes place. 

The other Chapters in this volume deal mainly with the machinery of governance while this one, by contrast, deals mainly with the ghost in the machine, those dispositions, loyalties, sympathies, beliefs, feelings and sensitivities that together constitute a political identity. Rather than using the matrix format at the end to present alternative scenarios, this Chapter deploys the axes to identify what was, what is and what may become of Britishness. It then abridges into two directions of travel the complex possibilities of the post-devolution condition. These possibilities are separation and adaptation, the first a radical dissolution of the Union, the second a modest modification of the multi-national Union.

1 Scenario Axes: Identifying the ‘steady state’ Union
The two axes along which discussion about the future of Britishness can be arranged are reasonably clear. The first axis is the national/multinational axis and the second is the contract/solidarity axis. The direction of argument along these axes constitutes the alternative logics, formulae, codes and identities of nationalist separation and British integration. At the nationalist end of the first axis are located distinctive peoples – the Scots, Welsh, English and (with much less certainty) the Northern Irish – and these are ‘natural’ or ‘immediate’ personae, not necessarily in terms of ethnicity or descent but also in terms of civic belonging. Whichever form it takes, ethnic or civic, this nationality is one’s ‘first nature’ and not only has it a prior call upon one’s loyalty but it ought also to be the basis of one’s political belonging. If this proposition of national priority constitutes the logic of separation, then the formula of separation is: the national people is the sovereign people. At the multinational end of this axis stands the ‘constitutional’ people, an artificial persona which integrates particular national loyalties into a common political identity. It is artificial only in being ‘second nature’ - in the Burkean sense of a positive institutional achievement - and the operation of this second nature on the first produces a new combination. If that constitutes the logic of integration, then the formula of Britishness proposes: the constitutional people is the sovereign people. 




















































Logic and Formula of Integration

2 Devolution as a modification of ‘steady state’ Union


















There was much that was conservative about devolution and it was a Conservative, Sir Malcolm Rifkind, who captured it succinctly. The Union was always, he argued, ‘a partnership rather than an absorption, albeit a partnership of unequals’ involving a large degree of English goodwill. ‘If the future is not what it used to be’ it should be understood as evolution rather than revolution. While ‘it may be difficult for the constitutional theorist to categorise it, the crucial question will be whether it works’ (Rifkind 1998). On balance, Rifkind thought devolution would work because it embodied both the ideal and the principle of Britishness: the ideal is multinational solidarity and the principle is association of the willing. This remains the governing perspective. 

When the then Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, Lord Falconer, argued that constitutional change was designed to guarantee the rights of the nations and thereby help to maintain the Union, he concluded that ‘it has done exactly that. Separatists have been stymied by devolution. And support for separation has flat-lined’. The Government, he made clear, was not concerned about the question of ‘constitutional symmetry’ but was committed to the practical accommodation of ‘difference and rough edges’ (Falconer 2006). One of those rough edges was the unresolved West Lothian Question and Labour gave the impression that it was a difference that neither could nor should be accommodated. That it could not be accommodated was a technical matter of constitutional design. That it should not be accommodated was not a technical but a national question: the English Question (see Chapter 4).





3 The end of Britishness: The future as separation
In State of the Union, McLean and McMillan concluded that unionism ‘always suffered from deep intellectual incoherence’. This incoherence was only ‘masked by its usefulness to politicians and its popular appeal’ and now that both had expired ‘can the union state survive without unionism’? They envisaged it lumbering on ‘anomalies and all, for at least a few decades more’ (2006: 256). If in 2006 McLean and McMillan could be dismissed for being unduly alarmist, in 2007 they had good reason to point to events which appeared to confirm their analysis. The success of the Scottish National Party in the Scottish Parliamentary elections of that year provoked some apocalyptic speculation about the future of the United Kingdom. Furthermore, in 2007 Sinn Fein was sharing office in Northern Ireland while Plaid Cymru had become part of a coalition administration in Wales. According to the scenario, the intermeshing drivers of separation are the nationalisation of popular sentiment; a loss of faith in British institutions; an inversion of Rose’s notion of integration through party competition; and English resentment at the perceived financial and political inequities of devolutionary arrangements.

Driver 1: the parting of public opinion
In the separatist scenario, ‘British’ comes to mean an empty label while English, Scottish, Welsh and Irish come to mean exclusive national identity. The intellectual attraction of this notion can be traced recently to Linda Colley’s influential work Britons (1992) which argued that Britain was an invention temporarily superimposed onto much older loyalties. Because the Empire, the sense of otherness from Europe and Protestantism had all but vanished, so too had all the concrete references of British identity. As a consequence, the natural loyalties of Welsh, Irish, Scottish and English have waxed as the artifice of Britishness has waned – and they have done so, inexorably. Survey evidence can be cited to confirm these trends.

The British Social Attitudes 23rd Report found evidence of decline in Britishness with fewer people willing to volunteer ‘British’ as the best way of describing themselves. Between 1996 and 2006 the proportion describing themselves as British became a demographic minority, declining from 52% to 44%. Though ‘Britishness has long been no more than a secondary identity both in Scotland and Wales’ the most dramatic trend was in England. ‘Already relatively weak in Scotland and Wales, Britishness now appears to have lost some ground in England to a sense of feeling English instead’. Britishness as the primary identity in England had declined from 59% to 48% (Heath, Martin and Elgenius 2007: 11-13). That these trends could have political consequences was made clear in other polls. In November 2006, an ICM poll for the Sunday Telegraph revealed that 52% of Scots respondents favoured independence (Hennessey and Kite 2007). The ‘main driver of a feeling of attachment or belonging to Britain is age, with younger people being less strongly attached to Britain’ (Heath and Roberts 2008: 2). The Government’s response to these separatist trends, one can argue, has been disjointed and lacking in credibility. It has either recounted the old story of Whiggish providence or it has reduced Britishness to a functional instrument.

The speeches of Gordon Brown frequently suffer from the former defect and give the impression of a metaphysical quest for enduring British values, a quest to ‘rediscover and to build from our history’ the shared values ‘that bind us together and give us common purpose’. His questions: ‘what is our equivalent for a national celebration of who we are and what we stand for?’ and ‘what is our equivalent of the national symbolism of a flag in every garden?’ have been thought to be very un-British, suggesting that the deformation of Britishness is well advanced (Brown 2006; Hannan 2007). Those in Government who are addicted to a corporate marketing of national identity suffer from the latter defect, understanding Britishness as some sort of mission statement. ‘Most other countries have a national mission embodied in their constitution’ (Wills 2006). In short, the scenario predicts that ‘British’ will become entirely vacuous compared with the rich substance of nationalism. Britishness becomes dispensable as people become persuaded that popular identity should find unique expression in separate institutions. To make Britishness a political quest may actually provoke the very nationalisation of opinion it seeks to prevent (Bechhofer and McCrone 2007: 260).

Driver 2: loss of faith in British institutions
This scenario identifies the loss of faith progressing to a tipping point. There is a push factor and a pull factor. The push factor is disenchantment with central government in general and with its policies in particular. At the grand level, affection for the Monarchy, Parliament, the BBC, even the NHS, has been declining. At the specific level, disaffection with, for example, the war in Iraq captures both forms of disenchantment: decision-making immune to popular pressure and policy immune to public influence (see Heath and Roberts 2008: 20). The pull factor is the attraction of more responsive, national institutions encouraged by the process of globalisation. According to Nairn, who synthesizes both factors of disenchantment, globalisation makes some larger states ‘irreversibly “smaller”, in the sense of rendering older styles of imperium and domination impossible’. In this new world order ‘smaller is, if not better, then at least just as good’ and it is no surprise that ‘the United Kingdom should be the one prime site’ for this to happen. Nairn gives Britishness a life expectancy of five years (2007: 131-2) and even the Scottish Unionist Allan Massie fears it may struggle to survive for another ten (2007). These predictions find support from those who look to Europe as a larger and more sympathetic association for small countries like Scotland and Wales (Jamieson 2007).

Therefore, British institutions will give way to what Scottish nationalists have called a ‘social union’, one which maintains the civic but dissolves the political bonds. British institutions, according to Margo Macdonald, now lack public esteem but the ‘social union’ is worth preserving ‘and should encompass all the distinct national and regional communities’, an argument that counters those who claim that separation will divide families throughout the United Kingdom (The Scotsman 2007). This gives a nationalist twist to the academic interpretation of Paterson who noted that changing attitudes are suggestive of ‘break-up’ but who concluded that ‘there is really no reason to believe that Britain as a set of relationships among people is anywhere close to disintegrating’ (2002: 40). A ‘set of relationships’ (social union) will continue within the islands but political union has had its day. The leader of the SNP, Alex Salmond has argued that ‘The 18th-century Union is past its sell-by date’ and no longer serves any political function except to promote resentment. He thought it important ‘to retain the close co-operation we currently enjoy in terms of social, economic and cultural links’ (2007). The Scots could be persuaded of the merits of independence in a referendum, probably not in 2010, but possibly by the time of a third SNP election victory in 2015.

Driver 3: party competition – from functionalism to territoriality
Rose had argued that one of the key integrative elements in the United Kingdom was the party system. The major parties (Northern Ireland excepted) helped to translate territorial concerns into the common (functional) language of British politics because to ‘give major importance to questions of national identity would distract attention from functional issues’ like health, education and economic policy (Rose 1982: 67). As questions of national identity are paid greater attention (the point made by Hurd), party competition will have the opposite effect, raising not subduing issues of national allegiance. 

For example, the Conservative Party already supports English votes on English laws and this is the first step along the road to the party becoming explicitly what it has become implicitly for some, a party of English nationalism. To be an English party does not ‘sound like a party of government’, but this would only matter in the old British state (Hazell 2006:226). As the mood of separatism grows, this would be a positive advantage. Simon Heffer has argued for some time that the Conservatives should campaign on Home Rule for England. If the Conservatives in a future General Election reach 265 English seats ‘they should prepare a campaign to ensure that English rights are secured, and English laws passed without interference from others’. In short, the Conservative ‘route to power is in England, and lies in creating a distinct English polity’ (Heffer 2007a). Britain has become ‘simply a geographical entity’ (Heffer 2007b), a codeword for Labour’s (Scottish and Welsh) exploitation of England.  Here is one simple answer to the old conundrum: why should a party overwhelmingly English in its basis and outlook defend the Union so vigorously (Blake 1985: 361-2)? The new answer is that it should no longer do so because that sort of British ‘primordialism’ is dead (McLean and McMillan 2006: 249). It should leave the Labour Party shackled to the corpse of Britishness and condemn it to irrelevance (Heffer 2000c). 

Driver 4: English ‘backlash’ - the end of solidarity
The other side of the Conservative factor is the English Question. There are two grievances that constitute this question, one political, the denial of English self-governance, and the other economic, discrimination in public expenditure. A prescient Leader in The Observer on July 2 2006 thought that if ‘the English are told often enough they should feel aggrieved at the results of devolution, they’ll start to believe it’. They do seem to believe it now. A Sunday Telegraph ICM poll found that 59% of English respondents approved of Scottish independence; that 68% favoured an English Parliament; and that 60% thought it was unjustified for Scotland to have a higher level of public expenditure per head of population than England (Hennessey and Kite 2007). There is a sense that the political rights of the English are being ignored and this makes the unthinkable thinkable. In part this has to do with a cult of victimhood, recounted in the English press, which has encouraged a jingoistic style, formally reluctant to break up the United Kingdom but if it should break up, confident that England will have 85% of the men and women and can keep its money at home (see Aughey 2007: Chapter 9). 











Table 1 Key steps to separation 2007-2017
Opinion				Institutions		Party			England
Decline in British identity	Alienation from Westminster	Anglicisation of Conservatives	     English disaffection
Growth in nationalism		Priority of devolved matters	Territorialisation of politics	   National assertiveness
‘Tipping point’ of opinion	Demands for autonomy	Conservative Election win 2009	   Demand for a new deal















4 The new Britishness: the future as adaptation
The scenario of separation is plausible but there is good cause to be cautious. To accept its assumptions wholesale is to read British politics through the newspaper headlines, a rather dubious thing to do. Confidence in the narrative of Britishness may have waned, faith in its institutions may have declined and belief in British providentialism long gone but these changes do not intimate the inevitable demise of the United Kingdom. Each driver of change in the first scenario has its complementary constraint in the second scenario of adaptation. 

Constraint 1: public opinion – continuity in change
There is little doubt the survey evidence confirms that people are more willing to volunteer the identity of Scottish or English or Welsh rather than British. Some analysts have expressed caution, however, about reading too much (nationalism) into that evidence. WL Miller argued that admitting that to say that someone feels more Scottish than British, for example, ‘is not to say how much more Scottish than British they feel’. The significance of that distinction for their willingness to dispense with Britishness altogether is uncertain (Miller 1998: 191-3). And a recent attitudinal study concluded that ‘we would be surprised if the break-up of Britain were to occur in the near future’ because the sense of Britishness remains widespread (Bechhofer and McCrone 2007: 252). 

It was also easy for commentators, in the drama of the formation of an SNP Executive in 2007, to overlook the fact that 66 per cent of the Scots voted for parties supporting the Union. There has been no dramatic breakthrough for nationalist parties. Moreover, majorities in all parts of the United Kingdom continue to support its existence as a multi-national state and support for separatism has actually declined in Scotland from 28% to 23% in the period 1997 to 2007. In Wales support for independence has remained around the 12%-13% mark. There has been a growth in English nationalist sentiment but, as we show below, this is a ‘mood’ and not yet a ‘movement’. Heath and Roberts concluded their survey of opinion polls thus: ‘in all three territories [they excluded Northern Ireland] a majority of residents have dual identities and there does not appear from these data to be a continuing decline in British identity or a continuous rise in exclusive national identities’ (2008: 8; see also Curtice 2008). 

Culturally, events such as the Olympics in 2012 could reconfirm a popular sense of Britishness (suggested by Goldsmith 2008); socially, Britishness can remain an identity that embraces the ethnic and national diversity of the United Kingdom; and constitutionally, the resources expended by the Government to redefine Britishness may have a popular impact. The scenario predicts a modification of circumstances as the nations of the United Kingdom adapt to the existence of devolved administrations and here Northern Ireland, rather than being the exception, may prove the rule. Active republican subversion has given way to active engagement in a constitutional settlement that requires, at least for its financial operation, a claim of solidarity across the United Kingdom. Sinn Fein ministers do not say this but it is implied in the operation of public policy. It is a formula that also applies to the SNP and Plaid Cymru.


Constraint 2: renovating national institutions
National institutions may prove more robust and flexible than separatists expect. This constructive adaptability is as much the recovery of an older mode of governance as a new beginning, once described as a ‘dual polity’ involving a deal between national elites and the central authorities in London ‘in which both had rights and duties’ (Bulpitt 1983: 98). Of course, this is not a literal ‘return’ but an adaptation to present needs of residues of constitutional thinking. For example, it has been argued that devolution has strengthened the democratic credentials of the nations in United Kingdom affairs rather than created ‘out of nothing of an additional tier of government’. Devolution ‘does not break with tradition but simply recognises the “less than perfect” integration within the state in a new and pragmatic way’ (Mitchell and Leicester: 1999). If Britishness can no longer be secured bureaucratically - by what Nevil Johnson (2000: 121) called 'self-administration' - it can be secured politically, that is within the democratic arena of assemblies and parliaments, adjusted on the basis of popular politics. This involves a more open process of public and institutional negotiation and requires real political stamina. 

Certainly, a more formal relationship between the devolved institutions and central government will develop, especially as the informal channels within Whitehall and Westminster can be no longer relied upon. A single Department of the Nations will probably take over the duties of the three existing national departments and the joint ministerial committee on devolution will be revived (Riddell 2007). Change is unlikely to come by way of a comprehensive constitutional convention but step by step. That ‘is the British tradition, and is also more practical politics’ (Hazell 2007a). What is developing is no ‘social union’ but a reformed political union (The Governance of Britain CM7170 2007; also Hazell 2007b). Indeed, the public’s judgement that Westminster elections are more important than devolved elections (measured by turn-out) is confirmed by data which shows that the ‘Westminster Parliament continues to be the most important source of primary legislation for each part of the country’ (Hazell 2007c: 233).

Constraint 3: parties’ interest in the United Kingdom
The adaptability scenario also assumes that constraints in party competition are equally real. Despite the operation of devolved institutions, despite the prominence of nationalists in those devolved institutions and despite the different configurations of party support, there continues to exist a British political culture with which citizens across the United Kingdom identify. There have been modifications in the basis of party identification since the early 1980s but the politics of national identity has not displaced the centrality of British party politics. 

Though the noises from the wilder shores of political commentary are persistent, there is no evidence that the Conservative Party leadership is seriously attracted by English nationalism. For example, Sir Malcolm Rifkind’s proposal in October 2007 that there should be an English Grand Committee in the Commons is only a variant on the party’s longstanding policy of English Votes on English Laws, a policy upon which it contested the General Elections in 2001 and 2005 (Rifkind 2007). The justification is equity and the objective is the re-balancing of a democratically asymmetrical Union. Yet how far could the Conservative Party push this? Kenneth Clarke’s Party Taskforce on the Constitution has ruled out Rifkind’s proposal and in evidence to the Justice Select Committee Clarke has described the West Lothian Question as a mere ‘niggle’ (http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmjust/uc75-iii/uc7501.htm (​http:​/​​/​www.publications.parliament.uk​/​pa​/​cm200708​/​cmselect​/​cmjust​/​uc75-iii​/​uc7501.htm​)) and there is no influential constituency pressing for more to be made of the West Lothian Question.







Constraint 4: Englishness: the continuity of solidarity
The absence of a self-consciously politicised Englishness continues to frustrate a separatist logic. There are obvious signs that people in England have become more willing to call themselves English rather than British but ‘even if this proves to be a permanent shift, it does not appear to pose any threat to the stability of the Union. Rather, it appears that opinion in England has simply adjusted to the new status quo’ (Curtice and Heath, 2000: 172). Though there is widespread sympathy for English votes on English laws and even an English Parliament, support for them is neither strong nor deeply rooted (Curtice 2006a: 138; Curtice 2006b). This suggests that English nationalism is a mood and not a movement. Evidence of increased English identification may suggest a nationalistic move but it is wise to be cautious. Indeed, a 5-year longitudinal study found that English identity had not developed to the detriment of British identity. Englishness was commonly constructed in apolitical terms. ‘English identity was acknowledged (and sometimes celebrated) as an aspect of personal identity, but its public expression was subject to normative constraints in the interests of civility and responsible citizenship’ (Condor 2002). There was little sign of that status anxiety informing the English nationalist agenda. 

This can be attributed to the curious mismatch between constitutional irritation and lived experience. There is indeed popular irritation at the anomaly of non-English votes on English laws and yet, because of the size and predominance of England-in-Britain, life can be led as if only England existed. This is a weakness for English nationalism because it also allows most English people to ignore the anomalies of devolution because they appear insignificant in the wider scheme of (English) matters. Thus, on the standard multi-option question support for an English Parliament has risen from 18% in 1999 to 27% in 2006, a very different perspective than the 68% in the ICM poll of November 2006 (see Chapter 4).

Summary








Key elements of adjustment 2007-2017
Opinion				Institutions		Party			England
Sustained British identity	Working with Westminster	Party consensus on UK	    Growth of Englishness
Limits to nationalism		Balance of national/central	Priority of functional politics	   Demand for political voice
Preference for stability	Fewer demands for autonomy	Conservative Election win 2013	Adjustment at Westminster

















Of course, these scenarios abstract from a complex constitutional reality. Either scenario is possible but a number of points can be made in conclusion. First, the separatist scenario is quite often the product of British politics read through newspaper headlines. Polling results are hugely dependent on the way in which the question is framed and media reporting of questionable polls encourages the belief that the Scots – and at times, the English - want independence. This misrepresents the state of public opinion which is less single-minded than the separatist scenario suggests. Second, there are two major dimensions to the British question, one Scottish and the other English. It is the Anglo-Scottish relationship which counts in the medium term. One could argue that the Scots are not so much hostile to things British as they are resistant to things English. This has given a distinctive flavour to expressions of Scottish nationality and, more significantly, has influenced the character of popular Scottishness. Scottish politics owes a lot to the sympathy still felt for British institutions, a sympathy not necessarily contradicted by devolution or even by feeling more Scottish than British. The prickly engagement with England (which is not new) does not undermine that sympathy. This ballast of opinion looks set to sustain a common political identity beyond 2020 even if there will be policy differences and ideological difficulties between Ministers at Holyrood and Westminster.
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